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“A RATIONALITY
LARGER THAN
THE MATERIAL
UNIVERSE”
Irving Massey
Coleridge and German Philosophy:
The Poet in the Land of Logic
by Paul Hamilton. London:
Continuum, 2007. Pp. 192.
$138.00 cloth.
Coleridge and the Crisis of Reason
by Richard Berkeley. New York:
Palgrave, 2007. Pp. 240. $69.95
cloth.

Paul Hamilton’s book would do
better as the subject of a seminar
than of a review. It assumes a fresh
reading, plus total recall, of European philosophy at least from Kant
to Kierkegaard, as well as of all the
relevant literary texts. It does not
stoop to summary or explanation.
In a word, it is not a book for the
intellectually timid. One had better
care deeply about the issues that it
raises, because it places great demands on a reader.
The abstract printed on the back
cover of the book states a large part
of Hamilton’s argument more clearly
than the text itself does: “Coleridge’s
infectious attachment to German
(post-Kantian) philosophy was due
to its symmetries with the structure
of his Christian belief . . . Its comprehensiveness, however, rendered
redundant further theological description, undermining the faith it
had seemed to support.” It may be
because of Coleridge’s devotion to
German thought that his attachment to Christianity, although obviously central to his life and work in
one sense, seems at times in another
sense only ancillary: an outrigger running in tandem with his philosophy.
Despite his commitment to German
philosophy, though, when Coleridge
rebels against its all-inclusive style,
he does seem to be craving an alternative that offers something more
than either quasi-religion or mere
talk about religion. This alternative
emerges (perhaps somewhat arbitrarily) as institutional theism, a real
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and conceptual structure that Coleridge builds up gradually alongside
his preoccupation with Continental
philosophy. The growth of Coleridge’s need for religion in this almost tangible sense is documented
in the recent work by Donald M.
Craig, Robert Southey and Romantic
Apostasy, which has a substantial
amount of material on Coleridge.
Coleridge’s rebellion against the
sense of constriction created by the
German philosophical frame may
also be detected, according to Hamilton, in what he calls the “mystery
poems,” “The Rime of the Ancient
Mariner,” “Kubla Khan,” and
“Christabel,” all of which flirt with
a major transgression. Perhaps in
these poems divinity itself has assumed a transgressive form (56).
Whether or not Coleridge later repudiated this element in the poems
(52), their resolutely unfinished—or,
one might say, unfinishable—quality
clearly does keep them outside any
hermetic philosophic system. (Whether they are much more compatible
with orthodox Christianity than
with German philosophy is another
question.) In his conclusion, in fact,
Hamilton follows Coleridge in arguing against any closed, terminable,
self-sufficient poetry.
Hamilton’s last chapter, “Spelling
the World,” is a tour de force. It opens
with a section titled “The Mammaloschen,” or “mother tongue.” In Yiddish, the word “mammeloschen”
refers to Yiddish itself. Here it
serves to introduce an astonishing
passage in Coleridge about a child’s

emergence into consciousness, into
language, and into an awareness of
God, through its interaction with its
mother. The child literally spells its
world into being as it begins to identify its mother (121).
One of the respects in which Coleridge found systematic German
philosophy inadequate was in its
failure to acknowledge the centrality of personal affect. Once more,
the infant-mother relationship is the
touchstone, and the model, again, is
language. The sounds of a word are
liable to fall apart; the word can lose
its meaning, even vanish, until we
can “touch” it again; so a child in the
dark will sometimes cry, “I am not
here, touch me, mother, that I may
be here!” (128). Human touch is a
prerequisite for reality, meaning,
and identity.
In the end, though, Hamilton
does call on a different aspect of
German philosophy to support another Coleridgean view—namely,
that the aesthetic cannot be a final
value. (If I understand him correctly, Hamilton imputes the opposite view to Wordsworth.) This is
an important point, since one can
often feel that Coleridge is an almostfailed poet, or a poet malgré lui; alternatively, that his poetry sits
uneasily among his floods of philosophical or autobiographical prose:
that one can’t really tell where it fits
in, or whether it fits at all. If, on the
other hand, poetry is only one of the
forms in which larger human expression finds its articulation, in which
poetry is only a name for a certain
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part of mental breathing, so to speak,
then Coleridge’s poetry and prose do
fit together. “The Jena idea of poetry,
as Walter Benjamin famously stated,
was prose, a much wider practice
than any literary establishment might
encompass, and something with a
place for each of us” (138).
This is a book to tease, or torment, one into thought.
Ambitious as Hamilton’s book is, its
ambition is more than matched by
that of Richard Berkeley’s. Hamilton’s work is much livelier and more
engaging; Berkeley’s is more systematic, even pedantic, in pursuing
the nuances of Coleridge’s opinions
about German philosophy. It is only
gradually that one realizes what is
at stake: not really Coleridge’s opinions about anything, but the nature
of truth itself. Berkeley confronts
what one might choose to identify
as the second most important problem in philosophy, after the nature
of consciousness—namely, whether
reason is a natural or (at least in some
sense) a supernatural phenomenon.
Berkeley’s title may sound grandiloquent and vague until one realizes that the author is in fact trying
to deal with the essential nature of
reason. Berkeley claims that for
Coleridge, “[R]eason is not a human
activity, rather it is something external to which human beings stand in
relation. Thus Coleridge describes
reason as ‘the super individual of each
man by which he is man’ ” (190). Similarly, Friedrich Jacobi says, “[I]f we
understand by reason, the principle
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of cognition in general, then it is the
spirit, out of which the whole living
nature of man is made . . . he is a
form that it has taken on” (190–91).
A collapse into pantheism, then,
carried, for Coleridge, “not merely
the threat of atheism and fatalism, it
also carried the far more pervasive
threat of the collapse of reason itself” (161). For Coleridge, “this brink
[the brink of pantheism] signals not
so much a descent into an unacceptable ontology as the implosion of
the rational self, or of reason itself”
(162).
Why should this be? It may be
helpful to translate the problem into
simpler contemporary terms. Let us
assume that the conclusion that 2 +
2 = 4 is the product of physical activity in our neurons. If this is true,
then there is no reason why the same
neurons might not yield a different
result: say, 2 + 2 = 5, or 25. There is
no one (other than some other process similarly grounded in matter
itself, some other electrochemical
mechanism) to evaluate the outcome or to determine its validity. In
other words, if reason is a purely
physical process, there is no judge
or referee to be found anywhere to
appraise its results. Even by pointing
out that it is finally our physiology
that puts us in a position to reach a
rational conclusion, or any conclusion at all, we would not be altering
the case: our physical existence may
be an essential condition for rationality, but it cannot dictate or ratify the
conclusion itself. Without subscribing to the anthropic principle, one
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could legitimately quote the cosmologist John Barrow here: there has to
be “a rationality larger than the material universe” (cited by Jonathan
Taylor, Science and Omniscience in
Nineteenth-Century Literature [Brighton, Eng.: Sussex Academic Press,
2007], 51).
This is, apparently, the “crisis of
reason” that Coleridge was struggling to avoid. If pantheism or Spinozism (or some other system that
implied that reason was rooted in
the physical processes of the universe) were to prevail, then all would
go dark in the chamber of Coleridge’s
mind.
Berkeley has no hesitation in attaching some passages in Coleridge’s
most important poems directly
to this anxiety. “And what if all of
animated nature / Be but organic
Harps diversely fram’d, / That
tremble into thought, as o’er them
sweeps, / Plastic and vast, one intellectual Breeze, / At once the
Soul of each, and God of all?”
(16–17). Even this wording, achieved
after much struggle (17), leaves one
in the same basic quandary: if the divine afflatus were not there, or only
intermittently there (as in “Frost at
Midnight”), one would immediately be engulfed by silence and
blank solitude. All depends, then,
on being assured of a reliable, even
if sometimes only potential, divine
presence. Worst of all, of course,
would be the possibility that the materialist interpretation is right, and
that the wind is not God’s breath at
all, but just the physical movement

of the air. Then, without divinity,
we would lose our individuality and
our identity, and our very (pun intended) “raison d’être.” “[I]f the
breeze is everything, then the harp’s
tune can have no meaning” (210).
“[T]he speculations of The Eolian
Harp lead inexorably to the contrasted horrors of the supernatural
poetry: the existential blankness of
The Ancient Mariner and the intrusive alien other of Christabel that
reduces will to automatism” (209).
In fact, one might say of Christabel
that it not only denies the freedom
of the will, but that it also illustrates
the mechanism by which pantheism (taken here as a variety of materialism) subverts free will: Christabel,
becoming snakelike, becomes part
of nature, which, in turn, imposes
its automatisms upon human behavior. She is threatened by, or indeed
comes to exemplify, “the extinction of
rational self-understanding” (209).
“Throughout Coleridge’s poetry
and philosophy the predicament of
human subjectivity and rationality
is the key issue, so that the Eolian
harp has a hidden significance for
his entire intellectual life” (209–10).
Berkeley arrives at these conclusions only after extraordinary efforts.
He studies Coleridge’s marginalia
on the German philosophers in exhaustive detail, undaunted by the
confusions, self-contradictions, and
misinterpretations, not to mention
the frequently incoherent plagiarisms, that riddle Coleridge’s texts.
It seems fair to say that between
them Paul Hamilton and Richard
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Berkeley have added new dimensions to the canonical work of
Thomas McFarland on Coleridge.
Reading through a series of
scholarly works in sequence, one
finds certain distinctions and groupings forming naturally in one’s
mind. One major division in this
taxonomy lies between books that
are written about something and
books that are written for something.
Both of these books, but especially
the Berkeley book, fall in the latter
category. Though modest in its stated
intention—namely, to elucidate a
conflict in Coleridge’s thinking—
Coleridge and the Crisis of Reason
forces one to confront a crucial
problem in philosophy on its own
terms.
—SUNY at Buffalo
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